Ã山ǿ¼é

Michael Blome-Tillmann

Academic title(s): 

Associate Professor & William Dawson Scholar

Michael Blome-Tillmann
Contact Information
Address: 

855 Sherbrooke St. W.
Montreal, Quebec
H3A 2T7

Phone: 
514-398-4693
Email address: 
michael.blome [at] mcgill.ca
Office: 
Leacock 915
Research areas: 
Epistemology
Philosophy of Language
Biography: 

Michael Blome-Tillmann earned a BPhil (2003) and DPhil (2007) in Philosophy from the University of Oxford. Before joining the Ã山ǿ¼é faculty in 2009 he was the Stevenson Junior Research Fellow in the Arts at University College, Oxford. More recently (2014-16) he was a Marie Curie Experienced Researcher at the University of Cambridge.

Blome-Tillmann's primary areas of research lie in epistemology, the philosophy of language, and especially their intersection (the semantics of knowledge attributions). He has published articles on a number of topics in epistemology, including scepticism, closure, Moorean reasoning, reliabilism, and epistemic contextualism, but also on topics in the philosophy of language. A monograph developing his views on epistemic contextualism has appeared in 2014 with Oxford University Press.

He enjoys discussing a wide variety of philosophical topics.

For more details on his current research please visit his .

Selected publications: 

Monographs:

  1. Knowledge and Presuppositions, Oxford University Press (2014).

Some Articles:

  1. Sensitivity Actually, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
  2. Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law, in: Thought 4/2 (2015), pp. 102-112.
  3. Ignorance, Presuppositions, and the Simple View, in: Mind 124/496 (2015), pp. 1221-1230.
  4. Counter Closure and Knowledge despite Falsehood, in: Philosophical Quarterly 64/257 (2014), pp. 552-568 (with Brian Ball).
  5. Solving the Moorean Puzzle, in: Philosophical Studies 172/2 (2015), pp. 493-514.
  6. Knowledge and Implicatures, in: Synthese 190/18 (2013), pp. 4293-4319.
  7. Indexical Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon, in: Erkenntnis 78/6 (2013, pp. 1317-1336 (with Brian Ball).
  8. Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms, in: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94/1 (2013), pp. 89–100.
  9. Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them), in: Philosophy Compass 8/2 (2013), pp. 170-185.
  10. Knowledge and Presuppositions, in: Mind 118/470 (2009), pp. 241-294.
  11. Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109/1 (2009), pp. 279-309.
  12. Contextualism, Safety and Epistemic Relevance, in: Philosophical Studies 143/3 (2009), pp. 383-394.
  13. Epistemic Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Interaction of 'Knowledge'-Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Embeddings, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79/2 (2009), pp. 315-331.
  14. Conversational Implicature and the Cancellability Test, in: Analysis 68/298 (2008), pp. 156-160.
  15. The Indexicality of 'Knowledge', in: Philosophical Studies 138/1 (2008), pp. 29-53.
  16. The Folly of Trying to Define Knowledge, in: Analysis 67/295 (2007), pp. 214-219.
  17. Contextualism and the Epistemological Enterprise, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CVII (2007), pp. 387-394.
  18. A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CVI (2006), pp. 383-392.
Back to top